Cargo Theft Report

Applying the Brakes to Road Cargo Crime in Europe

Public version excluding Appendix D (Europol Restricted)

The Hague, 2009
Table of Contents

1. Introduction 2
2. Background 3
   2.1. Aims and Objectives 4
   2.2. Definitions 4
   2.3. Scope 5
3. Nature of Cargo Theft 6
4. Situation in Working Group Member States 11
   4.1. Belgium 11
   4.2. France 12
   4.3. UK 13
   4.4. Spain 15
   4.5. The Netherlands 17
5. Summary 20
6. Recommendations 21

Appendix A - Modi Operandi 25
Appendix B - Prevention Measures 27
Appendix C - Minimum Standards for Response to and Investigation of Road Freight Crime 32
Appendix D - EUROPOL Restricted Document (not included; available for law enforcement through Europol National Units)
1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is built on the fundamental principal of free movement of people and goods. This principal has seen the European economy grow, providing new business opportunities across the whole of Europe. The same business opportunities have been seized by organised crime groups, who see the ever increasing value of goods moved around the European Union as ‘easy pickings’ and both an income source in its own right or as a funding source for other criminal activity such as drug dealing. The majority of freight transport in the EU takes place on the road, therefore the significance of road freight transport for the economy of the EU and the need to protect it is obvious. Consequently road freight will be the focus of this report, and the report does not cover issues such as seaport and airport security.

CASE STUDY 1

In the Yorkshire Area of the UK, analysis of criminal activity has shown that organised crime gangs are committing cargo crime across the UK to generate proceeds to fund other criminal activity such as the importation and sale of illegal drugs

Reports such as the NEA\(^1\) report in 2007, looking at the need for secure freight parking along the Trans-European road network, and the EU Parliament’s report on “Organised Theft of commercial vehicles and other loads in the European Union” of May 2007, have highlighted this problem. The continued expansion of the EU provides further criminal opportunities. If unchecked, it will damage the economic competitiveness of companies, particularly small and medium enterprises, whose goods are stolen whilst in the supply chain phase. The transnational nature of today’s European supply chain makes this truly a trans-national crime, often with criminals from one country committing crime in another, offloading those goods in a third and reselling them in yet another country.

On a police service by police service basis, freight related crime is generally not seen as a priority and therefore statistics are relatively poor. However by looking across the European Union as a whole, the trans-national scale of this

\(^1\) NEA Transportonderzoek- en opleiding B.V. (transport research and training)
crime and the value of it in terms of losses to the industry, and its growing violent nature in terms of physical attacks on drivers, are obvious.

A recent report (February 2008) published by the International Road Union (IRU) and International Transport Forum (ITF) highlighted that over the period 2000-2005:

- 17% of all drivers have suffered an attack during the 5-year period investigated
- 30% of attacked drivers have been attacked more than once
- 21% of drivers were physically assaulted
- 60% of the attacks targeted the vehicle and its load
- 42% of the attacks took place in truck parking areas
- 30% of the attacked drivers did not report the incident to the police
- Countries where the highest number of surveyed attacks occurred, per million tonnes of international traffic, are: Romania (5.03/Mt), Hungary (1.31/Mt), and Poland (1.21/Mt)

According to the aforementioned 2007 EU Parliament report, the Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) estimated losses of 8.2 billion Euros across the whole of Europe, which when viewed in full economic loss terms, including cost of replacement goods, re-shipping and reputational damage etc. are just a fraction of the actual damage. Another major factor for the freight industry is the resulting fear of violence, for example companies have difficulties in recruiting female drivers due to the fear of violence.

2. Background

This report has been produced by a Europol working group, established to look at the issues related to cargo/freight crime on a European level. It consisted of police representatives from several EU Member States and also members of TAPA. This police/industry partnership acknowledged the need to work collaboratively in this area, share information and intelligence, in order to combat an area of crime of mutual concern.

The group had been established following discussions by Europol and law enforcement representatives at Europol's High Level Expert Meeting on Property Crime in 2007, where a proposal to create an expert group from EU Member States to examine this issue further, was made by the Belgium Federal Police.

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2 A European wide organisation of supply chain security experts from the private sector
2.1 Aims and Objectives

- To agree on a common definition of cargo crime and standard terminology
- To promote awareness of the issues across EU Member States law enforcement agencies
- To give an insight into current *modi operandi* (MOs)
- To give an insight into the different approaches adopted by MS
- To develop guidelines for both prevention and investigation for this type of crime

2.2 Definitions

For the purpose of this working group, cargo crime and freight crime are interchangeable terms. The expert group agreed the following definition as a basis for their work:

**Road Related CARGO THEFT** is defined as any theft of shipment committed during its road transportation or within a warehouse, but excluding internal petty theft.

To further agree on terminology and increase mutual understanding the following definitions were agreed:

- **Hijack** - occasions where force, violence or threats are used against a driver and the vehicle is stolen with its load (this includes theft by robbery)
- **Theft of** - where an unattended vehicle and/or trailer are stolen with the load
- **Theft from** - thefts of load from stationary vehicles (e.g. by curtain slashing) or from delivery vehicles left unlocked/unattended
- **Deception/Diversion** - relates to deceptions where drivers/companies are deceived into delivering to a different destination than the intended one (commonly referred to as ‘Round the Corner’); including ‘e-crime’ where bogus logistics companies are established to divert the delivery
- **Warehouse** - burglaries of commercial premises which form part of the supply chain in all the above definitions.

Any attempt to commit these offences is included in that definition.
2.3 Scope

As already indicated, there are no official statistics available internationally on the phenomenon of cargo theft. However, TAPA have created an Incident Information System (IIS), supporting its members and accessible also for law enforcement. One aspect of the IIS is a database where statistics on incidents are stored. Like in many other areas, the quality of data also depends on the extent to which data is provided. Nonetheless, the TAPA database is currently the only source with statistical information on cargo theft within the EU.

Apart from estimates on European wide losses (8.2 billion Euros, as indicated above) TAPA also provides more in-depth information such as the ‘loss rate per billion Euro of GDP’, indicating risks for and losses of its members, and thereby illustrating the scope of the problem within the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Risk Ranking</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IIS Losses [€]</th>
<th>2007 GDP [$]</th>
<th>TAPA Losses per Billion of Euro</th>
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### 3. Nature of Cargo Theft

Cargo theft is a problem occurring across the European Union. It is an ongoing threat, with numerous gangs and organised elements targeting road freight throughout Europe. Easily re-salable goods represent the largest share of stolen property, but criminals have repeatedly shown that they are willing to steal almost anything.

One of the latest “hot” categories of property stolen is metal of varying types, from scrap to processed goods. Fluctuation in the metal market worldwide and a shortage of product has made this a lucrative area for thieves. Hotspots throughout Europe have not changed very much, with the UK and France experiencing the largest share of incidents. However, new threats have been developing in other countries previously thought of as relatively safe.

Although crime has been increasing along statistical norms, in line with previous years, it has been shown that dedicated police units focussed exclusively on cargo crime can, and do, have an immediate impact on troubled spots. This can have the effect of simply displacing the crime to other locations. However, where specialist units have evolved, such as in Belgium, France and the UK, there has been a noticeable shift in attitude, enabling the police to direct more, albeit still small, numbers of resources to the problem.

The various types of MO have, for the great part, remained the same, with “curtain slash/jump-ups” being the cause of the majority of losses. However, criminals are showing an increasing willingness to employ firearms and violence in the pursuit of their goals and in a number of cases have demonstrated little regard for human life. Hijacking, particularly armed, has shown a significant increase in several countries, most noticeably in the UK.
CASE STUDY 2

In 2006 in France, the inter-regional specialized court of justice from Lille (Department 59) coordinated several investigations as a response to a series of nonferrous metal thefts (copper, nickel). All crimes were committed by a team of perpetrators acting as police officers at a police checkpoint. They abducted and held the truck drivers, while stealing a high tonnage of metal from the trailers.

- 30th JAN 2006: robbery involving the theft 24 tons of nickel in Tancarville (Department 76) to the detriment of a truck driver by perpetrators impersonating police officers.

- 27th FEB 2006: robbery involving the theft of 25 tons of copper in Tergnier (Department 02) to the detriment of a truck driver by perpetrators impersonating police officers.

- 20th MAR 2006: robbery involving the theft of 21 tons of nickel in Sandouville (Department 76) to the detriment of a truck driver by perpetrators impersonating police officers.

- 20th APR 2006: armed robbery and hostage-taking of a metal recycling professional in Reims (Department 51) by a highly organized military style crime group, stealing 40 tons of Copper.

In May and June 2006, two criminal groups, targeted by the police, were arrested by an investigation team “VAMADOM FRET”. The manager of a recycling business was also arrested and interviewed by police officers. The analysis of his bookkeeping indicated that a part of the stolen nickel and copper was handled via his own company, together with another company owned by his cousin.

In October 2007 the unsolicited statements of two former members of staff provided further evidence in determining that these two managers, coming from the same family, were having close links to perpetrators delivering, concealing and receiving the stolen goods in other recycling firms. Those criminals carrying handguns and communicating by walkie-talkies were using special security measures while delivering the stolen goods, positioning and setting up large-scale security measures around each delivery zone.

On 11th MAR 2008, a judiciary police operation, coordinated by the Gendarmerie (OCLDI), led to the arrest of nine criminals in the suburbs of Paris (Department 75), in particular the managers of the recycling firms, some members of their family and some of their employees. During search operations in their offices, 435,000 Euros (cash) and 2 luxury Mercedes cars were seized.

More detailed descriptions of current MOs can be found in Appendix A.
There have been a number of successes for law enforcement but these are isolated, and in real terms freight crime can be seen as a low risk/high reward type of crime. Successful MOs quickly spread across the EU and the criminals, having developed their own fast efficient supply chain for stolen goods, either steal goods to order or they have readily available markets for their goods. The intervention window in which law enforcement can respond successfully to a reported crime is shrinking, with criminals being able to hijack, unload and dump a truck in under an hour. This is further compounded by the transnational nature of the crime as stated previously. Consequently national law enforcement agencies deal with crimes in isolation, not realising the bigger EU-wide nature of the crime.

While cargo theft occurs in freight-forwarding yards, warehouses and during transportation in trucks, as airfreight and on ships, the load is particularly vulnerable whilst at rest, either parked during transit or whilst in the process of being loaded onto or unloaded from trucks.

For a small business operating on a ‘just-in-time’ basis, the loss of freight may threaten viability - particularly if insurance cover is inadequate or compensation payments are contested. Further, the illegal sale of stolen cargo undercuts prices in legitimate businesses.

The theft of ‘hot products’ is common. Apart from metal, as highlighted previously, other more traditional ‘hot products’ are those that are easily disposed of yet retain a high black market value, such as alcohol, computers, entertainment equipment, name brand clothing, cigarettes and prescription drugs. The resale of ‘hot product’ cargo may be as lucrative as drug dealing but has far fewer risks. For example, a single truckload of cigarettes may be worth up to 2 million Euros. The crime is very much market driven, like any other business, and goods are stolen to feed a consumer demand; often the goods are pre-sold prior to the theft.

Many incidents go unreported to the police for a variety of reasons or indeed are reported in countries other than where the crime occurred. This not only compounds the lack of accurate data for crime analysis and trend identification but it also highlights an area of concern about driver involvement in these crimes.

Driver involvement can be both voluntary as a willing accomplice, a forced accomplice due to threats to family or himself etc. or as an involuntary accomplice by talking openly about the value of the load in bars/truck stops and so on. Driver involvement, active or passive, is a concern for the industry and police alike.

Some estimates indicate a high level of driver involvement, but drivers are possibly the weakest link in the security of the supply chain. They are also the first line of defence and there is a need to train and educate them on cargo crime and personal safety issues whilst on the road.
International Cargo Risk 2007 - Europe

[Map of Europe with risk levels indicated by color: Low, Guarded, Elevated, High, Severe]

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4. Situation in Working Group Member States

The current working group represents a small number of European countries, and the examples of police activity and threats are listed to show headline facts but are by no means a full and exhaustive list.

4.1 Belgium

Belgium is one of the success stories in Europe. The problem of cargo theft was damaging the reputation of Belgium as a country to ship goods through. Encouraged by increased media awareness and resultant political support, the Belgian Federal Police have deployed significant resources to combating the problem in their country. That is not to say that Belgium should now be considered a safe area as there is still a high level of threat in the country, especially in the areas surrounding the channel ports. However, the threat is slightly different, with drivers themselves more likely to be the targets rather than the loads themselves.

The top five hot spots areas are:

- Turnhout
- Antwerp
- Kortrijk
- Brugge
- Dendermonde
4.2 France

In France, analysis of the cargo theft phenomenon, coordination of investigations related to cargo theft and management of the most important cases is the responsibility of the OCLDI\(^3\).

With 1,491 cargo thefts reported in 2007 (3,403 in 2002), France remains a high threat area in this matter. Thefts are mainly concentrated in an area 150 km around Paris and major cities such as Lyon, Bordeaux and Marseilles. It is also evident that criminals target motorways, especially the A1, A4, A10, A6, A7 and A9.

15 % of offences are thefts from warehouses.

77 % of offences are thefts from vehicles (curtain slashing), committed in rest areas along motorways and national roads. Offenders using this particular modus operandi are mainly originating from Eastern Europe (mostly Romanians). These teams of perpetrators are very mobile and use reconnaissance vehicles (“scout cars”) in order to avoid police controls. Stolen goods are either sold to local receivers or transported to Romania using minivans, private cars or heavy goods vehicles.

3% of offences are robberies, mostly committed by French mobile gangs or criminal groups from the suburbs (either of French or foreign origin, e.g. Northern Africa, in most cases). These gangs are heavily armed. They usually wear police or customs uniforms and they organize false controls in order to force the driver to stop.

A recent trend is the creation of fake truck companies by offenders, who further reply to invitations to tender. They then steal (or rather embezzle) the merchandise they are supposed to transport. Each fake company is closed down after a short period of time, and another one then created in a different location.

When a criminal group specialized in cargo theft is identified, a task force, composed of local and regional police forces, is established with the support of OCLDI: in 2007, 384 offenders were arrested as a result of the activities of these task forces.

\(^3\) Law enforcement agency of the French Gendarmerie in charge of the fight against itinerant crime (“Office Central de Lutte contre la Délinquance Itinérante”)
4.3 The United Kingdom

The UK is viewed as the centre of excellence for tackling road freight crime, but crime levels remain high spread all over the country.

UK police indicate that several types of incident represent the majority share of all reporting in the UK. These include keys left in the ignition, tilt slash/jump up, load diversion together with regular occurrences of hijack and other crimes with
violence. Foreign drivers have been particularly targeted over the last months. Frustratingly, a large proportion of these crimes are avoidable with the employment of the simplest of measures and common sense.

The UK Home Office and Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) have established TruckPol to coordinate and advise all police forces on issues related to cargo crime. All 43 UK police forces share crime and intelligence information with TruckPol so they can build a picture of road freight crime offending throughout the UK. TruckPol also has excellent partnership agreements with the supply chain industry and is able to disseminate trends and best practice in crime reduction advice to the industry.

Other successful schemes such as TruckWatch are established in areas such as Yorkshire/Humberside which have made good links with the industry and helped reduce cargo related crime by increased industry awareness and targeted prevention campaigns. During 2008 three more TruckWatch schemes have emerged in the UK. The Midland region, North West region and Eastern region schemes are now up and running.

Also in March 2008 TruckPol launched a UK wide minimum standards of reporting and investigation guideline for law enforcement and supply chain industry. The purpose of the document is to encourage standardisation in the reporting and initial investigation of road freight crime in the UK.
In conjunction with the above document there are online video training modules for use by the supply chain industry and law enforcement agencies. The training is accessed via the TruckPol website at www.truckpol.com.

4.4 Spain

In Spain “Unidad Técnica de Policía Judicial de la Guardia Civil” is responsible for combating cargo theft.

However, this unit does not cover the whole Spanish territory. Consequently all information which is sent is related to approximately 90% of the reported cases only (see the map below).

The situation, especially around the major cities, continues to represent significant risk to poorly protected goods and vehicles.
Cargo theft by force 2006

Cargo theft by violence/robbery 2006
4.5 The Netherlands

There is awareness that cargo theft is a big problem for the transport industry and for the safety of the drivers. Encouraged by increased media attention there is also political support for tackling this problem.

Public and Private partners come together in the Foundation for Tackling Vehicle Crime (AVc, see www.stavc.nl). In addition, the Netherlands Transport and Logistics Association (TLN) is a partner in AVc, which, every half year, produces statistics about the theft of and from commercial vehicles.

Commercial Vehicles 2007
In another initiative, public parties (the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management) and private parties (the Dutch Association of Transport Users and Transport on Own Account (EVO), Royal Dutch Road Transport Employers Federation (KNV), the Federation of Insurers (VvV), Netherlands Transport and Logistics Association (TLN), Holland International Distribution Council (NDL)) have agreed on a

Covenant on Tackling Crime in the Road Transport Sector

The objective of the Action Plan for the transport industry is to reduce crime in this sector by 25%.

The following agreements have been made within the scope of this covenant:

1. Analysis of the road transport industry
2. Creation of more safe parking areas
3. Training, crime prevention and information
4. Creation of a platform for location-specific services based on cell broadcast
5. Improvements related to staff
6. Promoting and advancing tracking and tracing
7. Crime reduction bases on the chain approach
8. Report checklist
9. Transport and Logistics Quality Marking

In the meantime the National Police Agency (KLPD) created a Team Transport Crime. This team conducts long term analyses on the theft of load in the road transport industry.
Meerjarig overzicht van het aantal diefstallen in de wegtransportsector waarbij aangifte is gedaan.

Of particular importance is the type of load shown in the graphic below:

1. computer hardware
2. sound/audio equipment
3. domestic goods
4. clothing/textiles and shoes
5. metals
For several months the National Police Agency has recorded very good results by using a bait truck with load, parked on parking places near the main roads.

Also good results were achieved by the special Team Transport Crime of the Upper Region Crime Investigation Unit in the South of the Netherlands. There is a good cooperation with the prosecutors and police in Belgium, but also with insurance companies, e.g. for their right on recovery. This team has developed check lists in several languages for drivers to report a theft. These checklists are available for all police agencies in the Netherlands.

The latest development is an announcement by the Minister of Transport and Water Management of the availability of 10 million Euros for the adjustment and improvement of parking places.

5. **Summary**

This report provided an overview of the current situation of police and freight industry activity against cargo crime in working group member states. It also highlighted the gaps in knowledge and information available to fully assess the problem.

Whilst there are pockets of good practice, there is no real coordination of effort or approach in terms of both prevention methods and intelligence sharing. However, when decisions were made to tackle the problem, good results have been obtained. Nonetheless, the dynamic nature of this criminal activity means no agency can be complacent.

New methods of criminal activity move swiftly from one country to another, leaving police often lagging behind in their preventative strategies.

Road cargo crime is still very much a low risk/high reward crime with links to other serious organised criminal activity. It is increasingly involving violence and the safety of the driver is of greater importance than the protection of the load.

Road cargo crime is not simply a crime problem but an economic problem, with many billions of Euros lost each year, where a partnership approach with the industry is required on a European level.

The enlargement of the EU has seen new supply chains being developed. Major manufacturer’s are locating to the East of Europe and distributing goods across Europe. This will increase the value of road freight, and its vulnerability continues to attract more organised crime gangs into these areas.

One of the fundamental principals for the foundation of the European Union is the free movement of goods. Road related cargo crime threatens this principal and therefore should be tackled in a coordinated manner involving both public and private bodies across the EU. This coordinated activity needs to take place at both trans-national, and EU regional level.
6 Recommendations

This list of recommendations is not exhaustive. Suggestions should be seen as potential initiatives that may be taken to enhance the work already being carried out by operational teams, thus providing an added value. The importance of these suggestions may already be known to the investigative teams.

Where national strategies exist, such as UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands they should define and communicate the responsibility for the coordination of the fight against and prevention of cargo theft. These strategies should include information on specific national agencies responsible for investigation, intelligence gathering and interagency partnership cooperation.

Existing law enforcement cargo theft task forces/expertise should be networked together across the EU to create both regional and trans-national groups, assisting to create operational plans designed to interrupt, apprehend and dismantle cargo theft organisations and their operatives. These groups should be dynamic and seek to involve active participation by representatives from the transport and insurance sectors. They should have intelligence, prevention, research and enforcement focuses.

Member states should undertake an analysis of cargo crime, ideally a threat assessment, using agreed definitions, or include it as a specific theme under relevant national documents. It should quantify the problem of cargo theft and security from both an economic and a security standpoint.

For sharing intelligence and information relating to cargo thefts and cargo theft suspects on an international level, the use of Europol (e.g. the Information System and Analysis Work File Furtum) should be considered.

There is also a need for national law enforcement intelligence databases to store information relating to cargo thieves that can be readily accessed by police assigned to investigate cargo theft crimes. Often the subjects apprehended for cargo related crime are found to have a criminal history involving other cargo or commercial vehicle thefts, but are not linked in investigative terms.

Where examples of best practice exist they should be evaluated and rolled out nationally and trans-nationally to gain maximum benefit. A list of best practice should be maintained and shared amongst member states, and, where funding permits, pilot projects could be developed to implement these in other member states.

The creation of the Cargo Theft Working Group has demonstrated a requirement for cooperation and action on trans-national level. The current momentum needs to be both maintained and developed further, in order to reduce both the impact on and across member states. This will ultimately assist in applying the brakes to road cargo crime in Europe.
The TAPA Incident Information System (IIS)

Another potentially helpful tool in combating cargo theft is the TAPA IIS. This was conceived by TAPA EMEA (Europe, Middle East, and Africa) members and designed to improve the availability and the flow of information on crimes against high-technology logistics supply chains within the industry and between industry and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). Its scope has subsequently been broadened to encompass not solely hi-tech freight chains but also other high value freight. Its goal is to provide a centralised resource of knowledge related to criminality against freight in transit within the EMEA region, and to facilitate the dissemination of that information to member companies and to LEAs.

What are the benefits?

- It facilitates the rapid dissemination of incident occurrence, which should aid in the investigation and recovery of stolen items.
- It provides well supported statistical analyses of problem areas to allow corrective and pre-emptive actions to be taken.
- It increases awareness of the cargo theft problem at local, National and International levels.

What does IIS provide?

- A service of "Flash" e-mail Incident Event Notification to rapidly broadcast information about new incidents as soon as they are reported
- A database of incidents against member’s freight can be stored in a common format, analysed and made available to all members and to relevant Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA’s)
- A managed directory of contacts within LEA’s, manufacturers and logistics security personnel
- A directory of links to sources of manufacturers’ product descriptions to support investigative activities
- Also, a Monthly Bulletin summarising recent incident information and other pertinent analyses of the reported data is disseminated

Recently TAPA IIS has launched the ‘IIS mapping’ using Google Earth and Maps. These tools allow law enforcement officers and TAPA members to visualize the incidents reported in the IIS database in a structured way using options to drill down, based on year of incident, quarter, type of incident and even to visualize a single incident and to get all relevant information (i.e. date, location, incident type, commodity affected, loss value and more). All this is done through an easy and user friendly interface.
The IIS mapping could be used as a practical tool for cargo crime analyses and the planning of security measures as the following examples suggest (non-exhaustive list of options):

1. Incidents trends comparison such as incidents type changes – e.g. theft of/from vehicles in the UK Q3 2007 Vs. Q3 2008

2. Checking if a specific parking area is safe to use or if it should be avoided due to many incidents reported in its vicinity.
3. Checking for specific routes where cargo crimes are frequently reported making them potentially risky.

4. Checking for incident details around a specific location to be able to improve the implementation of security measures designated to cope with typical MOs in the area.

The maps can be used by opening the incidents file (available on the IIS website) on any PC with an installation of Google Earth. The incidents file will be updated on a monthly basis. Best results are achieved when users are online, nevertheless offline analyses is also possible. For members who might have difficulties to install Google Earth (due to IT restrictions) it is also possible to use a link (posted on the IIS website) to open the IIS incidents online in Google Maps.

Experts (members) who wish to have separate maps for their own company’s incident analyses can send a spreadsheet of incidents to the IIS TAPA EMEA (incidents@tapaemea.com) and will receive a separate file that can be opened by Google Earth for their internal use - this file will contain only the reporting company’s incidents, sent by the IIS service provider in a secure way and will not be available to anyone else; the incidents however, will be added to the overall IIS database as anonymous without any disclosure of identifying details of the reporting company. That way both the reporting company and IIS/TAPA EMEA will mutually benefit from the reporting. The batch incident spreadsheet can be downloaded on

http://www.tapaemea.com/download/Batch_incident_records.xls

Further information is available for registered members on the TAPA EMEA website: ACTIVITIES & PROGRAMS > IIS > IIS Database > Incidents map;

http://www.tapaemea.com/members/map.php?navId=4&subnavId=2&subnav2Id=2&subnav3Id=5
Appendix A
Modi operandi

Curtain slashing/jump up thefts

At first goods are identified by slashing the side of a curtain sided vehicle. Assuming the goods are desirable, the goods may then be stolen immediately, otherwise a ruse may be used further into the journey. This is the most popular method of theft.

Load diversion

A call will be made to the driver purporting to be from his depot or his customer stating that he should change his route. He will then be intercepted by the criminals.

Deception

The vehicle or the load will be collected from the warehouse by a criminal with fraudulent documents purporting to be the driver. Theft by deception continues to flourish in the UK and particularly against foreign employees with a large number of incidents reported.

The use of fake documents to collect goods from warehouses and depots has also been heavily reported throughout Europe, with the UK and Germany showing some significant losses due to this crime. Poor information security and lax procedures have contributed to make this a low risk, high gain endeavour for criminals.

E-enabled crime/Bogus logistic companies

The threat of e-enabled crime will see online vulnerabilities exploited and its opportunities maximised: the establishment of a web presence and creation of a bogus logistics company, who tender for contracts with no intention to deliver the goods to their final destination.

Gas or explosives

Gas will allegedly be piped through the air vents into the driver’s cabin or explosives may be used as a diversion. Gas related incidents have been reported across Europe, in Spain, the UK, France, Italy and Belgium, while in Sweden armed gangs have been using explosives.
Impersonation of police/customs officers

Criminals dressed as police or customs officers will signal to the driver that he must pull over, at which point they will take control of the vehicle, often using violence to do so. The uniforms worn by the criminals are often genuine.

The sophistication of disguises has increased with criminals now seemingly aware that they can no longer rely on simple flashing blue lights to stop vehicles. Drivers are reminded that normally they will only be asked to stop by uniformed officers in marked vehicles and, when in doubt, to use their vulnerable load cards.  

Staged accident

Criminals will stage an accident so that the driver will have to stop. They will then take the vehicle from him by force.

This technique has been used in a number of different crimes and not exclusively in the UK. The technique is risky but one of the best ways to bypass security measures such as off route alarms and panic buttons. Security managers should review reporting procedures for drivers.

Forced stop

Criminals may set up a fake checkpoint on the road so that the driver will have to stop. Again, the vehicle will be taken by force.

Moving vehicle attack

Offenders approach moving load from behind, jumping from their own vehicle onto the loaded truck and remove goods from the still driving vehicle, often by simply throwing them off the trailer.

Target vehicle marking

Offenders approach targeted vehicles and either mark them so they are easier to follow from distance: placing of reflective items at the rear or breaking light fittings to show a white light at the rear.

Theft of load or loaded vehicles from compound

Offenders approach and remove either loads or entire loaded vehicles and drive away often utilising information from current of previous legitimate employees.

4 Vulnerable load cards were introduced by the transport industry of some EU Member States. The card explains (for example to police) that the driver is all right with any police controls though not in dark and remote places. It suggests that the driver follows the patrol car to the nearest police station or similar before the control is done. However, most EU police forces do not acknowledge this card officially.
APPENDIX B
Prevention measures

Like all crime prevention methods these need to be balanced against risk and the cost effectiveness of implementation. Good practice in prevention includes:

**Vetting**

Employee involvement either active or passive is a concern in many cargo related crimes. Prior to recruiting staff, vigorous background checks should be made to ensure no previous criminal history. These include company staff and those used by sub-contractors. Employee references and identity documents such as driving licences should be checked as standard practice.

Vetting of companies used as sub-contractors should be undertaken prior to issuing a contract. Asking to speak to previous customers and checking how long they have been established will help minimise the risk of cargo loss.

**The cargo or freight yard**

The first line of defence is security in the warehouse yard, where trucks are loaded up and stored before departure. These loaded vehicles, left vulnerable by poor security measures, can be perceived as invitations by thieves looking to gorge themselves on stolen cargo.

Areas such as regional/national distribution centres are high risk areas. The perimeter outside of the yard also requires security consideration, as, often, criminals will keep areas under surveillance for days prior to an attack. Vulnerability to attacks increases if cargo has been delivered ahead of schedule, possibly even outside of normal working hours forcing the driver to wait with his truck in the gate or somewhere nearby by. This offers a great opportunity for theft.

Warehouse managers should take a layered approach to the yard, starting with perimeter fencing, making sure that it is adequate to deterring encroachment. An 8 foot or 2.5 m high good quality security link fence topped with barbed wire outriggers (the type you see on typical high security areas like prisons) is a good deterrent.

Access to the yard must be restricted with good quality control measures in place. Good use of natural and technical surveillance (CCTV) should be made, ensuring adequate lighting and systems management.

Thieves will use the yard trucks to move the trailers around if they have to, in order to get at their target. Securing vehicle keys and keeping high risk and hot
loads in the most secure areas will make it difficult, and hopefully deter them from the attack.

Depending on the risk to the load, a combination of physical security, including a number of guards that is appropriate to the size of a yard, as well as good quality technological solutions (cameras, lighting, motion detectors, alarms etc.) will provide the best protection.

Companies need to know who their shippers are. They also need to identify the trucks and drivers that show up at their gates. They should request proper identification, make sure that the company logos on the trucks are permanently imprinted on the sides and are not temporary placards and ask for the correct shipping documentation.

**On-the-road**

The most vulnerable part of the supply chain is while the truck is on the road or at rest on the road prior to reaching its final destination.

Prevention starts with good route planning by the driver or freight manager. Knowing when driving breaks are needed due to “drivers’ hours” legislation can mean it is better for a driver to rest prior to taking the load whilst it is in the security of the yard. There is little point for drivers to cover a short distance only before stopping when they could make the entire journey without a break if they rested first.

Once underway, drivers should be briefed on secure parking areas or areas to avoid in terms of crime hotspots and they should remain alert throughout the journey.

Cargo thieves can and will trail a truck for as far as 200 or 300 kilometres as it travels along its route. To make it easier for them to shadow the vehicle from a safe distance, crooks will often write something on the back door or place a reflective device on it that will allow them to see the truck from farther away. Another method is to break a small hole in a rear light, giving the trailing criminal a white light to follow from a distance behind the vehicle (like a cat’s eye). It is therefore important that a driver checks his vehicle after every stop to ensure it has not been tampered with in any way.

High risk and vulnerable loads can be driven in convoy to assist security and safety. In addition there are security companies that can provide pre-clearance of driver routes, consulting with senior drivers in order to ensure that company trucks are moving along the safest possible routes and not areas that will leave them vulnerable to hijacking. These routes also include areas that have been cleared as safe for the drivers to use as rest stops. Decisions such as these should not be left up to the drivers themselves.

Also important are general driver awareness and taking common sense precautions such as locking the vehicle when out of the vehicle for even the
shortest stop. Drivers should not talk about their load or route to people they meet or others in general.

Drivers travelling between countries or in a country they are not familiar with should have details of who to call should any criminal activity take place or is suspected of taking place.

**Tracking devices**

GPS systems allow truck movements to be monitored either during routine delivery or when notified that it is subject to a crime. Most GPS systems operate by line of sight, meaning their antenna has to see the sky in order to send tracking information. What professional cargo thieves will do is disconnect a GPS antenna the moment they steal a truck, thereby thwarting the system. In response, GPS manufacturers have tried to overcome this by concealing their antennas.

Cellular assisted GPS units don't require line of sight to a satellite, have no visible antennas and can be put in trailers or mixed with a truck's cargo in order to prevent it from being found.

Systems should be developed to escalate any activation to the police/law enforcement agencies. Companies managing these systems should be certified by the relevant national authorities.

**E-Seals/Seals**

When a truck has been sealed and leaves the facility, the integrity of that shipment is assured and as long as the sealed number is accurate on the shipping documentation, it is a very inexpensive way to identify potential theft.

The freight/logistics industry is making great use of RFID tags both passive and active. These devices allow the integrity of goods to be established and maintained throughout the journey.

**Protection of the company identity**

Drivers and companies should ensure they control company identifying items such as documents and company issued clothing. Thieves use shipping orders, consignment notes and company paperwork along with high visibility clothing to impersonate genuine employees and to collect loads unauthorised.

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5 ‘Radio-Frequency Identification’ is used in tags or transponders to store (unique) information. Attached to a product or other items like passports RFID devices (and readers) are useful for identification and tracking. Most common is the use of theft-preventive RFID tags in retailing.
Employers

Employers should adopt industry best practice and join self help groups such as TAPA and Truckwatch. These business led groups will help to underpin the principal of safety in numbers and help keep companies and drivers better informed on current threats and developments.

They should:

**Report**
Communicate all suspicious activity and theft IMMEDIATELY, as organised thieves are able to off-load goods quickly.

**Respond**
React to all false alarms as well as real ones. False alarms can be attempted break-ins at the yard or facility.

**Withhold**
Limit the release of details concerning cargo manifests, truck schedules or facility operations to those who really need to know.

**Know**
Know who the carrier and the driver is that they are releasing loads to. They should require drivers to submit proper identification when they enter a facility and a vehicle registration certificate. They should ensure background checks on companies and drivers have been undertaken.

**Monitor**
Keep an eye on delivery schedules and routes and view overdue shipments and route changes suspiciously. Wireless remote monitoring can help the recovery of stolen cargo.

**Maintain**
Always maintain the company's safety practices: trucks should be kept locked in the yard; alarm systems should be functioning and monitored by a central station; driving teams should be told that one driver must remain in the cab at all times.

**Review**
Review security regularly and be prepared to make changes.

**Screen**
Use rigorous pre-employment screening processes to keep all potential thieves off of the payroll. They should submit detailed employment applications, a photo and a prior employment history for at least the last 10 years. They should do a credit check and a check for criminal records.
They should check employees’ and sub-contractors’ backgrounds thoroughly, and query any unknown or unexpected driver turning up to collect a load.

**Communicate**

Communication is critical to good logistics, and good logistics is critical to the safety of cargo in transit. When companies allow their internal communications to break down, logistics suffers and cargo is damaged or stolen. Communication systems not only need to be in place, but must be audited and tested regularly. Plans for handling "exceptions to the rule" and unexpected events should be outlined in advance and understood by everyone.

Employers should communicate security processes regarding the facility and yard, as well as the roles employees are to play in security. Employees should be trained on basic procedures of how to report security incidents.

**Control**

Admittance to a facility should be controlled through an access control system such as a swipe card system.

**Identify**

Establish an identification card system. Cards should be laminated and include a photo of the employee, his or her name, signature and expiration date.

Employers should make it hard for non-authorised employees to obtain blank documents and unnecessary cargo information so they cannot forge paperwork.

**Inform**

Promote the use of crime stoppers, a confidential hotline number where employees can communicate any knowledge of employee participation in cargo theft without fear of reprisal.
APPENDIX C

Minimum standard of response & investigation for road freight crime

The intended purpose of this document is to recommend a minimum standard of police response & subsequent investigation for qualifying freight crime offences.

The organised nature of such crimes cannot be underestimated and there are identifiable links to other areas of criminality. Analysis has shown that there is a need to implement a cohesive response that addresses both the human cost and the wider economic impact of road freight crime.

The adoption of a common minimum standard of investigation for road freight crime/LGV crime will increase the chances of arrest, forensic capture and successful prosecution of offenders. This in turn will contribute to reassuring victims and the wider business community that there is a coordinated and appropriate level of response to these offences.

The initial action taken by officers/call centre staff receiving reports involving an LGV or its load is crucial. The actions outlined below should be adhered to as a minimum investigation standard.

Initial actions

A police officer should attend the crime scene and commence the investigation. A supervisory officer should be informed at the time that an offence is reported and ensure that these minimum standards of investigation are being complied with.

In the case of a theft of LGV with/without load, consideration should be given to circulating the theft on both a local, regional and national level, amongst relevant police/law enforcement agencies.

A crime report shall be completed as fully as possible including:

- All relevant vehicle details and identifying marks
- Full details of any load stolen, if known; enquiries may well have to be made with the relevant transport office of the haulier involved
- Full details of haulier/driver involved and contact names and numbers
- Any details obtained from GPS/tracking systems on the LGV or trailer and the steps taken to have them activated or interrogated for evidential use

Details of drivers’ mobile telephones should be obtained and permission should be sought to examine any such items and record details of recent incoming/outgoing calls or text messages.
Every effort should be made to identify potential witnesses and secure best evidence at or near to the scene. House to house enquiries should be considered if appropriate.

**Statement from drivers**

A comprehensive statement will be taken from the driver at the time that the offence is reported. The witness statement should include the following:

- Identification of his/her employer and length of employment
- Pick up point and drop off point for load
- Full details of load, if available
- The exact route taken following collection of the load and any stops en route
- Immediate action of the driver following the incident

**Foreign national LGV drivers**

A comprehensive statement will be taken from the driver at the time that the offence is reported together with elimination fingerprints and buccal swab for potential DNA checks at a later stage. If there are language difficulties at the time of reporting, an interpreter should be arranged at the time. In exceptional circumstances a brief summary can be obtained at the roadside using 'language line'.

It shall be the responsibility of the reporting officer to ensure that these victims are given support and assistance, immediately following an incident. Particular care is needed in respect of foreign nationals who may have lost their passports and other valuables during the incident. These victims will be given assistance in making travel arrangements home and will remain the responsibility of the reporting officer until their welfare is secured.

**Actions upon the recovery of stolen LGVs or trailers**

The recovery of a stolen LGV, (semi-) trailer or container is a major factor in the investigation. The location of such a recovery should be treated as a crime scene and evidence gathered and preserved.

A police officer should attend the scene and ensure scene preservation prior to attendance of SOCOs.

SOCOs should ideally attend the scene and examine the LGV or trailer *in situ*. Alternatively, local procedures may dictate that the vehicle is recovered to a safe location for forensic examination.

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6 Scene of Crime Officer
The tachograph chart or electronic tachograph data will be seized by suitably trained personnel and retained as an exhibit.

**Investigative principles**

Follow up investigations for LGV offences can be complicated and involve protracted enquiries. In most cases they involve identifying and developing evidential opportunities around CCTV footage, forensic submissions, and stolen property and identification issues.

In most cases a detective should be allocated to the enquiry for further investigation.

Nationwide or international law enforcement circulation of photographs of stolen property should be considered. ‘Pictures speak a thousand words’ and whilst it is very rare for photographs of the actual stolen property to be available, photographs of identical items could be provided e.g. by loss adjusters, insurers and company security managers.

Local/national press or trade magazine (truck/freight journals) circulations, also internet sites should be considered in publicising the crime. It should also be considered to invite calls for help in locating property or names of people responsible or any other information that may assist police. The same is applicable to general publicising and inviting calls to Crimestoppers. Possible rewards for recovery of property or arrests and successful prosecution of offenders should be considered as well (this will need liaison with loss adjusters/insurers before publicising).

eBay and similar internet auction sites can be of importance: More and more often, property stolen in LGV crime is being sold to unsuspecting customers via eBay. Interrogate this website for any trace of the stolen property being sold.

Where arrests are made or significant amounts of property are recovered during the course of the investigation, the investigating officer should inform their law enforcement headquarters or central investigative departments.